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FACTORS INFLUENCING RELATIONS 
BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTIES 
OF THAILAND AND LAOS 
Martin Stuart-Fox* 
ON THE SURFACE, relations between the Lao People's 
Revolutionary Party (LPRP) and the Communist Party of Thailand 
(CPT) are close and cordial. The Lao have expressed support for the 
Thai liberation movement, and the Thai have acclaimed the triumph 
of people's democracy in Laos. There is reason to believe, however, that 
relations are not as amicable as they appear. This paper will examine 
in historical perspective three sets of interlocking factors which affect 
relations between the two parties, and which are likely to become of 
increasing importance if and as the Thai insurgency continues to gain 
ground. 
The first of these factors concerns the Sino-Soviet dispute and ac- 
companying ideological differences. As the wars between Vietnam and 
Kampuchea and between China and Vietnam have both so starkly 
shown, ideological differences may serve to reinforce traditional 
antipathies based upon historical, ethnic, and geopolitical grounds. 
The resulting combination may cause relations to deteriorate to 
the point of war, even between states whose governments share a 
common devotion to Marxism-Leninism and the ideals of proletarian 
internationalism and solidarity. Increasingly the Thai and Lao com- 
munist parties find themselves on opposing sides of the Sino-Soviet 
divide-a development which promises to complicate relations be- 
tween the two parties. 
* An earlier version of this paper was presented at the second national con- 
ference of the Asian Studies Association of Australia at the University of New South 
Wales, Sydney, in May 1978. 
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A second factor influencing inter-party relations stems from the 
geopolitical position of Laos in the narrower context of a Thai- 
Vietnamese competition for dominance on the Southeast Asian main- 
land. What complicates this second factor is that both of the principal 
protagonists must conduct their affairs in the shadow of Peking's con- 
ception of a Chinese sphere of influence in the region. The deteriora- 
tion of relations between the People's Republic of China (PRC) and 
the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has in part obscured this 
ancient Thai-Vietnamese rivalry. In addition China's relations with 
the states of mainland Southeast Asia are conducted in the context of 
its dispute with the Soviet Union. But this should not obscure the im- 
portance for Laos (and also Kampuchea) of Thai-Vietnamese relations, 
for historically the sovereign status of the Lao state(s) has depended 
upon the degree to which the influence of either Vietnam or Thailand 
has been dominant, or mutually balanced the other. 
The third factor concerns irredentist Lao ambitions in the North- 
east of Thailand based upon the area's ethnic constitution and cultural 
traditions. This bilateral factor, while it may not rank in importance 
with the previous two, nevertheless must be considered in analyzing 
the current state of CPT-LPRP relations, for it threatens further to 
exacerbate differences that stem from broader ideological and geo- 
political considerations. From the combined perspectives presented by 
these three interlocking factors an attempt will be made to draw cer- 
tain tentative conclusions about the likely shape of future relations 
between Thailand and Laos both on a party to party level and perhaps 
eventually on a state to state level. 
Effects of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 
The communist parties of Thailand and Laos have come to find 
themselves on opposite sides in the Sino-Soviet dispute. The reasons for 
this are partly due to calculated self-interest, partly to inescapable geo- 
political conditions, and partly to historical accident. A Siamese Com- 
munist Party may have existed briefly in the 1930s when the Indo- 
chinese Communist Party (ICP) may also have sought recruits in Thai- 
land, but the present Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) dates its 
existence from 1942. At that time no fewer than four apparently distinct 
parties were operating on Thai territory: the Malay Communist Party 
in the far south, the ICP among Vietnamese in the northeast, the 
Chinese Communist Party of Thailand (CCPT) among overseas Chi- 
nese, and the CPT, which may at the time have been limited to ethnic 
Thai. 
The CPT probably owed much to the guidance of the CCPT until 
the latter reduced its activities following establishment of the PRC in 
1949 and most of its members joined the CPT. CPT links with the 
Chinese community in Thailand have thus continued, as have the 
party's ideological and organizational relations with Peking. The ma- 
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jority of members of the Central Committee of the CPT is reportedly 
still made up of ethnic Chinese,' although the full membership has 
never been published. Since its inception, therefore, the CPT has been 
almost entirely dependent upon Peking. Apart from a brief period from 
1946 to 1948, the CPT has been illegal in Thailand, and has been 
forced to operate underground. Many of its leaders have lived for ex- 
tended periods in Peking and news of the party's policies and activities 
have been published almost exclusively in Chinese news media, or over 
the Chinese-controlled clandestine radio station Voice of the People 
of Thailand (VOPT) that broadcasts in Thai from southern Yunnan. 
A relationship of sponsorship somewhat similar to that between 
the Chinese and Thai parties has existed between the Vietnamese and 
Lao, though for very different reasons. Whereas the former developed 
from the key historical role played by ethnic Chinese in the Thai com- 
munist movement, the latter originated in a common opposition to 
first the French and subsequently the American presence in Indochina. 
The Lao communist movement can trace its origins to those Lao 
who became members of the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP) in 
the 1930s. It was not until 1950 that the movement took on a character 
of its own when two organizations were set up in northern Vietnam, a 
resistance government of the State of Laos (Pathet Lao)2 and a broad 
political front later known as the Neo Lao Hak Xat (NLHX, the Lao 
Patriotic Front). Following the formal dissolution of the ICP in March 
1951, the Lao moved slowly in organizing their own party. Only in 
1955, according to official Pathet Lao accounts, was the Lao People's 
Party (later the Lao People's Revolutionary Party-LPRP) founded. 
Throughout its existence the Pathet Lao (PL) have maintained ex- 
ceptionally close ties with the Vietnamese communist movement, ties 
that have since been cemented by the signing in July 1977 of a 25-year 
Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation between the SRV and the Peo- 
ple's Democratic Republic of Laos (PDRL). 
Despite these differences in origins and alliances, official relations 
between the LPRP and the CPT have been, as far as can be determined, 
friendly and cooperative. With the escalation of communist activity in 
Thailand following the founding of the Thai Patriotic Front (TPF) 
early in 1965 and the subsequent initiation of armed struggle later in 
the year, aid channelled through the Pathet Lao became of increasing 
importance to the CPT. Party cadres and insurgents were trained in 
camps in Pathet Lao areas of Laos or were escorted in transit to North 
Vietnam and China, while agents, arms, and supplies found their way 
back across the Mekong.3 Infrequent published references to each other 
1 Justus M. van der Kroef, "Communism and Political Instability in Thailand," 
Issues and Studies, 12:9 (September 1976), p. 96. 
2 This is the term under which the Lao communist movement as a whole has 
been most widely known internationally, and it will be so used in this paper. 
3 For one of many accounts of this two-way traffic see the reports on the Thai 
National Security Council's White Paper on Communist Insurgency carried in The 
Voice of the Nation (Bangkok), September 3, 4, and 5, 1976. 
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were limited to mutual support for policies pursued. 
With the final victory of the Pathet Lao signed and sealed by the 
overthrow of the monarchy and proclamation of LPDR at the end of 
1975, a new situation prevailed along the middle reaches of the Mekong. 
A communist Laos in full control of the Lao river towns was in an 
excellent position to increase assistance to the Thai communists and 
thus to increase its influence within the Thai communist movement. 
To date this influence appears to have been exercised principally on 
behalf of those states with which Laos has the closest political and 
ideological relations, namely the SRV and the USSR, but this should 
not obscure the potential the Lao have to act in their own interests 
should the need arise. Since 1975 Laos has come to be ever more closely 
identified, through alliance with the Vietnamese, with the Soviet side 
of the Sino-Soviet dispute. At the same time continued CPT depen- 
dence upon Peking has meant that party relations across the Mekong 
have increasingly been influenced by differences between Moscow and 
Peking. This has already led to tensions between the CPT and LPRP, 
tensions which, exacerbated as they are by additional factors to be con- 
sidered below, could increase in the future to the point where they 
seriously affect the direction and progress of the Thai insurgency move- 
ment. 
The Lao have trodden a helpless path in the slippery ground be- 
tween Moscow and Peking. Despite what appears to have been real 
efforts to treat both as evenhandedly as possible,4 Laos has been in- 
evitably drawn into the Soviet orbit through Vientiane's relations with 
Hanoi, especially since the serious deterioration of relations between 
the Chinese and Vietnamese. Not surprisingly, as Lao relations with 
Moscow have become increasingly close, relations with Peking have 
cooled. The Chinese, however, perhaps in recognition of the Lao dilem- 
ma, have stopped short of denouncing the Lao regime in the kind of 
terms reserved for Hanoi.5 
Lao-Chinese relations lost something of their former warmth with 
the signing of a cease-fire with the Royal Lao Government in 1973. 
Despite Peking's stated approval of the subsequent formation of a Pro- 
visional Government of National Union representing equally com- 
munists and rightists, there is reason to believe the Chinese were un- 
happy at this departure from accepted Maoist practice. However, this 
did not prevent them from providing assistance to the new government, 
as well as giving separate aid grants to the Pathet Lao. Any reservations 
the Chinese may have expressed must have returned to haunt them 
with the PL victory in 1975. What was of far greater concern to the 
Chinese, however, was the rapid influx of Soviet technicians and ad- 
visers, whom Peking quickly accused of trying to replace the Amer- 
4 At least this has been the conclusion of most observers. See, e.g., MacAlister 
Brown and Joseph J. Zasloff, "Laos 1977: The Realities of Independence," Asian 
Survey, 18:2 (February 1978), p. 174. 
5 The only criticism that has appeared has been in the pro-Peking Hong Kong 
press. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), July 14, 1978. 
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icans.0 As Premier Hua Kuo Feng warned Lao Prime Minister Kaysone 
Phomvihan during the latter's visit to Peking in March 1976: 
The superpower that hawks 'detente' while extending its grabbling claws 
everywhere . . . [is] stepping up arms expansion and war preparations 
and attempting to bring more countries into its sphere of influence and 
play the hegemonic overlord.7 
Though the Chinese insisted that their relations with the Lao re- 
mained "correct," it was soon clear that the policies followed by the 
new regime in Vientiane scarcely met with Chinese approval. In an 
editorial congratulating the LPRP on the first anniversary of its found- 
ing, the Chinese once again called upon the Lao to maintain their 
"independence and self-reliance,"8 but to no avail. Laos was being 
drawn ever more closely into the Soviet orbit. In retrospect, a pro- 
Soviet bias was evident even in the new Lao regime's first year in power. 
Lao Prime Minister Kaysone Phomvihan twice visited Moscow in 1976, 
the second time at the head of the LPRP delegation to the 25th Con- 
gress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. He went only once 
to Peking. The agreement he signed with the Chinese for economic and 
technical assistance and cooperation was little more than a formal 
document, and Chinese aid to Laos has remained limited compared to 
that of the Soviet bloc. 
During 1977 the Soviet presence and influence in Laos increased 
considerably. Throughout the year the veritable stream of Soviet bloc 
delegations visiting Laos far outnumbered the Chinese, and a quick 
survey of the official Lao media showed that while a number of articles 
on Chinese achievements in science and technology were carried, news 
items with political content clearly favored the Soviets. At the same 
time the Soviet military presence in Laos increased. In April a high 
ranking Lao military mission led by the Minister of Defence Khamtay 
Siphandone visited the USSR for secret talks. By September the first ten 
MIG-21s had arrived at Vientiane's Wattay airport. Throughout the 
country Soviet and Eastern European teams of experts were everywhere 
in evidence. Kaysone's six-week tour of eight communist states, includ- 
ing Cuba and Mongolia, "cemented" the Soviet link. 
Only in the far northern Lao provinces abutting the Chinese bor- 
der has Peking maintained an important presence. A new agreement 
was signed in April 1976 to continue the construction of a system of 
roads begun in 1962 that snakes down from the Yunnanese frontier 
towards Ban Houei Sai and Luang Prabang.9 The Chinese were also 
6 New York Times, October 9, 1975. By the end of the year there were reported 
to be over 500 Soviet advisers and technicians in Laos. Ibid. December 25, 1975. 
7 Peking Review, March 19, 1976. 
S Editorial in Renmin Ribao (Peking) carried in Peking Review, December 10, 
1976. 
9Khaosan Pathet Lao (Vientiane) April 6, 1976, in USSR and Third World, 6: 
2-3 (April 1 to July 31, 1976), p. 104. See also Siang Pasason (Vientiane), May 11, 
1977. 
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reported to be guarding and supplying the "reeducation" camps set up 
in Phong Saly province for the more intractable former rightists. If the 
accounts of Thai prisoners released as a goodwill gesture are to be be- 
lieved, even the camp medical personnel were Chinese.10 In late 1977 
the Chinese apparently attempted to counter the overwhelming Soviet 
presence by offering to extend their road network further south, set up 
a number of light industries and, most spectacularly, build a railway 
from Yunnan to Kampuchea down the length of Laos."1 The Lao re- 
fused all three proposals. But this may not have been simply due to 
Soviet and Vietnamese pressure. The Chinese presence in northern 
Laos has caused concern in Vientiane for years, and the prospect of an 
extension of the Chinese presence further south may not have been 
palatable even to those unhappy over the degree to which Laos is sub- 
servient to Vietnam. 
By the middle of 1978 Chinese-Vietnamese relations were deterior- 
ating rapidly over the problem of the SRV's treatment of its ethnic 
Chinese minority. Initial Lao attempts to take a neutral position soon 
began to give way to a pro-Vietnamese stance.12 On the first anniversary 
of the signing of the treaty of friendship and cooperation between Laos 
and Vietnam, Kaysone affirmed that the Lao stood by the struggle of 
the Vietnamese people "to defend their independence, sovereignty, and 
territorial integrity against threats, pressure, trouble-making, provoca- 
tion, violation, slander and sabotage, committed by the imperialists and 
the international reactionaries." By using the Vietnamese term for 
the Chinese ("international reactionaries"), Kaysone committed Laos 
to the Vietnamese side of Hanoi's dispute with Peking, a position sub- 
sequently reiterated by the Lao media. A somewhat ambiguous state- 
ment later by Lao President Souphanouvong complaining that un- 
named third parties were attempting to "sow division between the Lao 
people and the Chinese people" may have reflected an attempt by the 
Lao ruling elite to right the balance.13 But the Lao came out firmly on 
the Vietnamese side following the overthrow of the Pol Pot regime in 
Cambodia and the Chinese invasion of Vietnam.14 
The Chinese reaction to these developments has been controlled. 
While Peking has reportedly withdrawn some 10,000 soldiers and road 
workers from northern Laos with the completion of a major section of 
road, between 5,000 and 8,000 remain.15 The Chinese have also ap- 
10 The Australian, February 15, 1978. 
11 Nayan Chanda, "Laos Caught in the Crossfire," FEER, June 16,1978. 
12 By the end of June a Lao army broadcast was calling upon the country's 
armed forces "in solidarity with Vietnamese armed forces, to improve themselves in 
the service of Indochinese and Southeast Asian sovereignty and independence," 
quoted by Agence France Presse (AFP) from Bangkok, June 29, 1978 (FBIS, June 
30, 1978) - 
1a New York Times, July 23, 1978. 
14 See commentaries carried by Khaosan Pathet Lao (Bulletin Quotidien), Jan- 
uary 9, 1979 and February 21, 1979. 
15 Nayan Chanda, "A New Threat from the Mountain Tribes," FEER, Septem- 
ber 1, 1978. 
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parently closed down their de facto consultate at Oudomsay, but this 
was at Lao urging. Otherwise full diplomatic relations have been main- 
tained on both sides. Thus while the Soviet Union undoubtedly holds 
the upper hand in Laos, the Chinese have refused to concede victory in 
this struggle for influence in such a strategic location. 
However, if Chinese influence within the LPRP is considerably less 
than that exercised by the Soviet Union, Soviet relations with the CPT 
have been nonexistent. The Russians have evidently felt that they 
could better exert an influence in Thailand by pursuing relations with 
the Thai Government than by supporting a relatively weak communist 
party so closely identified with Peking. This has left Peking in virtual 
control of the Thai revolution. Whether the Chinese exercise close 
direction at all levels of the insurgency movement-i.e., with the Thai 
People's Liberation Armed Forces (LPLAF)-is open to question, how- 
ever. What is clear is that since 1964, when the CPT came out clearly 
on the Chinese side of the debate over revisionism, it has followed a 
course of unwavering support for Peking. The decision taken accord- 
ing to the CPT in 1961, but not put into effect until 1964, to escalate 
the struggle from political agitation to armed revoluion constituted a 
deliberate application of the Maoist model. "The path of seizing po- 
litical power by armed force and surrounding the city with the country- 
side" still sums up the Maoist philosophy of the CPT.16 At the same 
time the CPT has been loud in its criticisms of "Soviet revisionism 
and the "Soviet social imperialists."17 
Since 1976, therefore, an ideological rift has opened between the 
LPRP and the CPT. The CPT has been consistent in its support for 
the Chinese and in its application of Maoist principles of revolution, 
while the Lao have gravitated from a neutral position during their 
own revolutionary struggle to a pro-Soviet stance in line with changing 
Vietnamese policy. On an official level this has not prevented state- 
ments of mutual support; nor on a practical level has it meant any 
discernible decrease in the flow of aid to the Thai insurgents.1s On the 
contrary, the flow of aid appears to have increased, but it is precisely 
because of this that friction has arisen, for such assistance is seldom 
given entirely altruistically. Indeed, the Lao appear to be using their 
new potential as a source of practical support for the Thai insurgents 
to undermine the ideological commitment of members of the CPT.19 
16 "The Dawn of a New Ycar of Unity and Victory," Voice of the People of 
Thailand (VOPT), December 31, 1976 (FBIS, January 6, 1977). 
17 See, e.g., VOPT, September 20, 1977 (FBIS, September 26, 1977) in which the 
claim is also made that with the phasing down of the U.S. military presence in 
Thailand the Soviets were attempting to take their place. The methods of the 
Russians, the broadcast warned, were "more dangerous and artistic" than those of 
the Americans! 
18 For CPT support for the Lao, see, e.g., VOPT, January 20, 1977 (FBIS,. 
January 28, 1977). For material assistance, see the account given in Bangkok Post 
Sunday Magazine, April 6,1975. 
19 John Everingham, last permanent Western correspondent to be expelled from 
Laos, personal communication, September 1977. Everingham reports meeting in 
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The threat that this poses to friendly relations between the Lao and 
Thai communist movements is obvious, but the threat is even more 
serious given Thai suspicions of Vietnamese intentions and the role 
the Lao are playing in bringing those intentions to fruition. The geo- 
graphical position of Laos alone would make it necessary to take the 
broad context of Thai-Vietnamese competition for cultural and po- 
litical dominance in mainland Southeast Asia into account in examin- 
ing the relationship between the LPRP and the CPT. Lao alliance with 
the Vietnamese identifies them in the eyes of all Thai with an ancient 
rival, and thereby inevitably generates a degree of distrust even be- 
tween fraternal parties. 
Thai-Vietnamese Rivalry 
It is probably too early to state that "The eliminations are over 
in determining which are the most vital civilizations on the peninsula 
[of Mainland Southeast Asia], and the finals are about to start. The 
finalists are Thailand and Vietnam."20 But there is a ring of reality 
about this statement that both Thai and Vietnamese might recognize. 
Once the movement of the Vietnamese and Thai down the coastal 
plains of Vietnam and the Menam Valley, respectively, had reached its 
southern limits, both states turned towards the Mekong basin where 
the Lao were too weak and disunited to resist them. From the moment 
that Vietnamese and Thai came into direct confrontation in Laos in 
the 18th century, Lao relations with each power have been a function 
of relations with the other. Changes in fortune saw first the Vietnamese 
then the Thai gain political control over the Lao principalities. In 
Cambodia an inconclusive struggle led to the establishment of a joint 
mandate. The arrival of the French in Cambodia and in Laos by the 
end of the nineteenth century had the effect of tipping the balance 
against the Thai, for the French succeeeded in effectively destroying 
Thai influence over both countries. 
Since the Second World War both Thailand and Vietnam have 
seen their defense and security as being intimately connected with the 
situation in Laos and Cambodia. A brief period of friendly relations 
between the Viet Minh and the "Free Thai" government from 1945 to 
1946 was brought to an abrupt end by the military coup that returned 
Marshal Pibun Songkram to power in Bangkok. Since then ideological 
differences have reinforced traditional antagonisms between Thailand 
and Vietnam, adding an edge to their rivalry for influence in Laos, a 
rivalry played out for at least a decade prior to 1975 in a semiclandes- 
tine war of secret forces, each side supporting its own Lao client. 
Vientiane a Thai student activist he had known in Bangkok. This student claimed 
to be a CPT agent sent to Laos after the Thai military coup of October 1976 to 
attend camps for CPT recruits. His instructions were to counter pro-Soviet propa- 
ganda on the part of the predominantly Lao instructors. 
20 Jeffrey Race, "The Future of Thailand," Pacific Community, 8: 2 (January 
1977), p. 321. 
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Lao-Thai relations therefore need to be understood in the light of 
this historical Thai-Vietnamese rivalry, a rivalry which is unlikely to 
disappear, even in the event of a communist government coming to 
power in Bangkok. For "the competition, if not conflict, between the 
two peoples is fundamental to the political life of mainland Southeast 
Asia and, therefore, to the permanent security considerations of Thai- 
land."2' And one might add "and of Vietnam." And as in the past, 
since opportunities for direct interference in each other's affairs are 
limited, the primary arenas in which this rivalry is likely to continue 
to be played out are the Mekong states of Laos and Kampuchea. 
The victory of the Pathet Lao in 1975 meant the victory of the 
Vietnamese, but a victory that is not necessarily final. The Thai have 
long considered that they have a special interest in Laos, and it is an 
interest any Thai government is bound to attempt to reassert should 
the opportunity arise. But any government in Bangkok will find it 
difficult to compete with the Vietnamese. Not only do many Lao fear 
cultural absorption by the Thai more than by the more ethnically, cul- 
turally, and linguistically dissimilar Vietnamese,2 but Vietnam has 
stolen a march that will be hard to match. The dominant position of 
influence Hanoi has acquired in Laos is clear from the terms of the 
Friendship treaty between the two states, the provisions of which tie 
Laos closely to the Vietnamese politically, militarily, economically, and 
culturally. Of the economic provisions, the most important is certainly 
the promised use of Danang as a duty free port and construction of a 
road system linking it with the Lao Mekong towns. Once completed, 
this will free the Lao from reliance upon Thailand for the transit of 
goods. The pact also included a border agreement, the secret provi- 
sions of which reportedly "rationalize" the border at two points, both 
in Hanoi's favor.23 
The military provisions of the agreement, however, were of greatest 
interest. Article two pledged close cooperation between the two powers 
and mutual support in "reinforcing the defence capacity, preserving 
the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity and defending 
the people's peaceful labour against all schemes and acts of sabotage by 
imperialism and foreign reactionary forces."24 The "hostile policy" of 
the Thai government, especially in permitting the use of its territory 
for American bases, was singled out as a principal threat. Military as- 
*sistance will be provided against "imperialism and foreign reactionary 
forces," a designation taken to include Lao rightist insurgents operating 
21 David A. Wilson, The United States and the Future of Thailand (New York: 
Praecrer, 1970), p. 52. 
22 During two years spent in Laos as correspondent for United Press Inter- 
national (UPI), the author quite frequently heard fears of Thai cultural domination 
expressed, especially among neutralist students and junior military officers. 
23 John Everingham, personal communication, January 1977. These areas are 
reportedly two "bulges" which the Vietnamese had previously occupied, one east of 
Savannakhet, the other southeast of Sam Neua. See Carlyle Thayer, "Viet Nam's 
External Relations: An Overview," Pacific Community, 9:2 (January 1978), p. 231, 
note 3. 
24 FEER, July 29, 1977. 
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from Thailand. The treaty therefore provides a legal basis for the 
stationing of Vietnamese troops in Laos for the forseeable future. 
The terms of the Lao-Vietnamese treaty call into question long- 
term Vietnamese objectives in Southeast Asia. It was a consistent claim 
of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea (Cambodia) that the Vietnamese 
intended to establish an Indochinese federation in which they would 
play the dominant role. What is evident is that since the inception of 
the Indochinese Communist Party, the Vietnamese have shown a con- 
tinuing interest in what happens in Kampuchea and Laos that repre- 
sents something more than an altruistic concern for one's neighbors. 
The 1951 platform of the Viet Nam Workers' Party (the Lao Dang) 
states in article 12 that: 
In the common interests of the three peoples, the people of Viet-Nam 
are willing to enter into long-term co-operation with the peoples of Laos 
and Cambodia, with a view to bringing about an independent, free, 
strong, and prosperous federation of states of Viet-Nam, Laos and Cam- 
bodia, if the three peoples so desire.25 (emphasis added) 
This is the earliest reference to an Indochinese federation in the 
form that the Kampucheans so object to. But it is also the last, at least 
in official publications resulting from the deliberations of the highest 
policy-making body in Vietnam, the National Congresses of the Viet- 
namese Communist Party. What is more, the Vietnamese have spe- 
cifically denied any such intentions. During the period of internal 
struggle that lasted until 1975 it seems clear the Vietnamese modified 
their position.26 The treaty with Laos must now be viewed as taking 
the place of any closer political union.27 This relationship of "militant 
solidarity" and "special friendship" is all that Hanoi now desires, but 
both were rejected by Kampuchea as resulting in a loss of independence 
similar to that in a formal federation. But while the provisions of the 
25-year treaty leave Vietnam in an ideal position in Laos, free of the 
obligations and drawbacks implicit in a federation, it also does permit 
the Thai a certain latitude they would otherwise not have had in 
pressing their own interests in Laos. 
Not all Lao are happy with the close relationship with Vietnam. 
Popular resentment of the Vietnamese presence and influence in Laos is 
25 People's China, Supplement, 3:9 (May 1, 1951), p. 8. Dennis J. Duncanson in 
"Indo-China: The Conflict Analysed," Conflict Studies, no. 39 (October 1973), p. 12, 
note 6, maintains that the last phrase, "if these peoples so desire," was only added 
in the English translation. 
26 It has been suggested that a move in the direction of federation was attempted 
with the signing of a joint declaration by delegates from North Vietnam, the Na- 
tional Liberation Front of South Vietnam, the Khmer Rouge, and the PL in 1970 
pledging mutual assistance in the struggle against U.S. imperialism. See Ellen J. 
Hammer, "Indochina: Communist but Non-aligned," Problems of Communism,, 
25:3 (May-June 1976), p. 2. 
27 Such a situation fulfils, so far as Laos is concerned, the demands of Vietnamese 
foreign policy of monolithic proletarianism and the possibility of pursuing "pro- 
tracted militancy" vis-A-vis Thailand, and by extension, ASEAN. See Douglas Pike, 
"Conceptions of Asian Security: Indochina," Asian Forum, 8: 4 (Autumn 1976), p. 84. 
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widespread-one reason why Vietnamese troops only visit Lao towns 
in small groups for short periods. Despite every attempt by the LPRP 
to encourage friendly feelings towards the Vietnamese, suspicion of 
Vietnamese motives runs deep, even within the Pathet Lao, some of 
whom have reportedly joined antigovernment insurgents in the south 
precisely for this reason.28 I have argued elsewhere that divisions exist 
within the politiburo of the Lao People's Revolutionary Party which 
can best be seen as differentiating a moderate Lao "nationalist" faction 
loosely grouped around Souphanouvong and Phoumi Vongvichit, from 
a hardline pro-Vietnamese majority led by Kaysone, rather than as an 
ideological division along strict Sino-Soviet lines.29 Charges that Kay- 
sone himself is more Vietnamese than Lao (his father was Vietnamese) 
rub a particularly raw nerve in Vientiane, and there were no fewer 
than three attempts on his life in the course of a year. It would clearly 
be in the best interests of Thai of any political persuasion to attempt 
to influence events in Laos in favour of the Lao "nationalists." And 
the Thai communists may well find themselves in a better position to 
do this in the future than the government in Bangkok. 
Since the Lao, given their geographical position, can hardly escape 
becoming embroiled in the long-term rivalry between Thai and Viet- 
namese, they are left with two alternatives: to throw in their lot with 
one or other of the two protagonists, or to attempt to balance one 
against the other by distancing themselves from both. While the domin- 
ant faction within the Lao politburo has opted for the Vietnamese, the 
latter course would appear to be preferred by the "nationalist" faction. 
However, given the power and ambitions of the Vietnamese, such a 
course is only possible with the support of one of the great powers. The 
Thai alone are an insufficient counterweight to the Vietnamese. The 
former Kampuchean regime turned to China, a course that would also 
be open to the Lao. Both states might have turned to the Soviet Union 
had Moscow not decided that its anti-Chinese interests were best served 
by fostering relations with Hanoi. The Soviet presence in Laos is un- 
likely to permit the Lao to counter Vietnamese pressure, for the Soviets 
will almost certainly defer to Hanoi over any conflict of interests in 
Laos. 
Thai-Vietnamese rivalry as it affects Laos is, however, compli- 
cated by a further factor, hostility leading, to the border war between 
Hanoi and Peking. Competition between Vietnamese and Chinese for 
influence in mainland southeast Asia has been traced back to the estab- 
lishment of a Thai Autonomous Region in southern China in 1953. 
While this is uncertain, it does seem that the setting up of the Thai 
Patriotic Front was a Chinese attempt to undercut Vietnam's growing 
28 AFP dispatch from Bangkok in English, August 21, 1977 (FBIS, August 91, 
1977). See also Robert Shaplen, "Letter from Laos," TIhe New Yorker, August 2, 
1976, p. 66. For reports of PL defections to the rebels, see Daily Tinme (Bangkok), 
February 22, 1977 (FBIS, February 23, 1977) . 
29 Martin Stuart-Fox, "The Lao Revolution: Leadership and Policy Differences," 
Australian Outlook, 31: 2 (August 1977), pp. 279-288. 
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influence in northeast Thailand. As early as 1966 the CPT, on behalf 
of Peking, criticized the failure of Hanoi to adopt a pro-Chinese posi- 
tion in the Sino-Soviet dispute.30 The Chinese were well aware that 
Vietnamese influence in Thailand might open the way for Soviet inter- 
ference in the Thai insurgency. With the signing of a 25-year treaty of 
friendship between Vietnam and the USSR and the entry of the SRV 
into Comecon, Peking's worst fears have been confirmed. The Chinese 
have a special interest, therefore, in counteracting Vietnamese influence 
not only in Thailand but also, if possible, in Laos and now in Kampu- 
chea. Chinese efforts in this direction are likely therefore to work in 
support of Thai interests in both states. 
The Lao alliance with the SRV has not enabled the LPRP to 
escape the continuing Thai-Vietnamese struggle for dominance in 
mainland Southeast Asia. If anything it has had an opposite effect. For 
the Thai are distrustful of Vietnamese intentions, especially following 
the invasion of Kampuchea; and whatever Hanoi's proclaimed policies 
towards Thailand, the Lao-Vietnamese alliance allows Vietnamese- 
Thai rivalry to continue, as it were, by proxy.3' Thus the Vietnamese- 
Thai struggle should be seen as continuing at two further levels: one 
affecting relations between the Lao and Thai governments; another 
relations between the LPRP and the CPT. 
LPRP-CPT relations within the Thai insurgency have been in- 
fluenced by Chinese-Vietnamese antipathies. There is evidence that a 
struggle for influence between the two powers has been waged for con- 
trol over the Thai revolution. The importance of this for long-term 
Thai-Vietnamese rivalry lies in the fact that if the CPT could be 
wooed away from its pro-Chinese position to one more sympathetic to 
the Vietnamese, Hanoi would have gone a long way towards reducing 
Peking's influence in the region, an influence which could favor the 
Thai. As the upper echelons of the CPT are staunchly pro-Chinese, 
Hanoi was forced to focus its propaganda at the middle-echelon level 
of the party and among the guerrillas of the Thai People's Liberation 
Armed Forces (TPLAF). Here the Lao again played a crucial role. 
Two events completely altered the nature of armed revolution in 
Thailand, opening the way for the Vietnamese to pursue their aims: 
the first was the victory of communists in South Vietnam, Kampuchea, 
and Laos; the second was the Thai military coup of December 6, 1976. 
An end to fighting and the U.S. presence allowed the Indochinese 
states to channel something of their considerable revolutionary experi- 
ence elsewhere-and where better than Thailand with whose govern- 
ment old scores were still to be settled. Already by the end of 1975 
30 Donald E. Weatherbee, The United Front in Thailand: A Documentary An- 
alysis (Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina, 1970), p. 48. 
31 Thus Vietnamese promises not to aid the Thai insurgents do not necessarily 
mean that aid will dry up. The Lao can always be held responsible. See FEER, 
November 10, 1978. 
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reports quoting diplomatic sources spoke of an increased flow of weap- 
ons to the Thai insurgents.32 
The violence of the Thai right-wing military coup and the harsh 
antileftist bans and penalties that followed ensured a notable increase 
in recruits for the CPT and its front organizations. These included 
hundreds of students, a number of ranking members of the Socialist 
Party of Thailand (SPT) and their followers, intellectuals, workers, 
and peasants. Many of these were directed to training camps in Laos33 
where their instructors included Vietnamese, Lao, and Thai cadres.34 
The CPT welcomed all new converts to the revolutionary cause, 
and called for the creation of an expanded national front to include 
not only workers, farmers, and small capitalists, but also "national 
capitalists of all nationalities," students, teachers, and intellectuals. 
The party specifically declared its willingness to join with "any political 
parties, organizations and people who are patriotic and democracy- 
loving."35 This resulted in the formation of the Committee for Coordi- 
nating Patriotic and Democratic Forces (CCPDF) on September 28, 
1977. The inclusion of student radicals and SPT members under the 
leadership of former MP Khaisaeng Suksai in this organization is likely 
to be significant for the future policies of the CPT since both are less 
ideologically committed to Peking. The long-term effect may be to 
strengthen the hand of pro-Soviet elements36 and those cadres within 
the party who would prefer the CPT to adopt a more even-handed 
approach to the Sino-Soviet dispute on the pragmatic grounds that this 
would ensure aid from both camps and permit the party more flexibil- 
ity in prosecuting the revolution.37 The Lao are in a position to en- 
courage any tendency within the CPT in this direction. Thai press re- 
ports of a division into pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet (pro-Vietnamnese) 
factions, however, cannot be definitely substantiated,38 and reports of 
32 New York Times, October 9, 1975. 
33 For Thai students training in Lao camps see Siam Rath (Bangkok), January 
29, 1977 (FBIS, February 3, 1977). 
34 Bangkok Post, February 7, 1976 (FBIS, February 9, 1976) for Vietnamese 
cadres taking seminars for Thai recruits. 
35 CPT Thirty-fourth Anniversary Statement, reprinted in Journal of Con- 
temporary Asia, 7: 3 (1977), pp. 4304-34. 
36 Moscow has reportedly deposited $10 million in Vientiane to send Thai 
students to study in the Soviet Union, Justus M. van der Kroef, "Thailand: A New 
Phase in the Insurgency," Pacific Community, 8: 4 (July 1977), pp. 615-616. 
37 The CPT has managed to gain support from student radicals and former 
socialists for its Maoist strategy of rural insurgency. VOPT, January 2, 1977 (FBIS, 
January 6, 1977); VOPT, September 3, 1977 (FBIS, September 7, 1977) . See also 
FEER, November 19, 1976, and the statement by four SPT leaders carried in Journal 
of Contemporary Asia, 7: 2 (1977), pp. 264-267. But it is also clear that the CPT is 
encountering some opposition from its new recruits to its pro-Chinese line. The 
National Student Centre of Thailand has stressed the necessity for students who have 
joined the armed struggle "to study and master the political line," and "seriously 
adjust themselves to the new concepts." VOPT, January 2, 1978 (FBIS, January 6, 
1978). 
38 General Saiyut Koetphon, Deputy Director of the Internal Security Operationm 
Command (ISOC), suggested in an interview that the TCP was losing ground 
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the founding of a separate pro-Soviet communist party in southern 
Thailand can be discounted. For evidence of a struggle for influence 
within the Thai revolution one must look at the pattern of insurgency. 
During the past decade armed insurgency in Thailand has ex- 
panded from a few minor incidents in the northeast of the country in 
1965 and 1966 to the present situation where well over half the na- 
tion's provinces have been declared "communist infiltrated."39 The 
number of insurgents has shown a slow but steady increase to an esti- 
mated figure in 1977 of some six to eight thousand men under arms 
supported by up to a million sympathizers.40 Of the four principal 
areas of insurgency, that in the south appears to be under Chinese 
control, though the situation is clouded by the Muslim separatist move- 
ment. That in the north, principally among Meo tribesmen has, at 
least since 1971, been firmly in Chinese hands.41 Weapons and supplies 
enter Thailand along the Chinese-built and controlled road network 
in northern Laos, while Meo cadres are trained in South China.42 The 
slight insurgent activity in the central-western provinces along the 
Burmese border is as yet of negligible importance. 
In the crucial northeastern Isan region, however, the insurgents 
have always drawn their principal support from Vietnam via Laos. 
Here Vietnamese influence is most pronounced. The intricate supply 
network linking Vietnam with northeastern Thailand across Laos en- 
ables Hanoi to move its agents rapidly into the region. This presented 
a standing threat to Chinese control of the Thai insurgency. Between 
1976 and 1978 Chinese and Vietnamese-backed insurgents competed 
for control of key base areas, in particular the strategic Khao Klor 
mountains where the provinces of Loei, Phitsanulok, and Petchabun 
come together, and in the southern provinces of the Thai northeast 
along the Kampuchean border where Kampuchean support of the CPT 
appears to have been part of a Chinese design to maintain Peking's 
influence in the Isan region vis-a-vis Hanoi.43 
since it had been unable to call a party congress because of an internal power 
struggle between pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet factions. Bangkok Post, February 7, 
1976. 
39 By mid-1978 the number was 46 of 73 provinces. FEER, July 28, 1978. 
40 Estimate by Anders Tandrup in FEER, February 27, 1976. These are slightly 
higher than figures given by ISOC. Bangkok World, February 3, 1977 (FBIS, Feb- 
ruary 4, 1977). 
41 Frank C. Darling, "Rural Insurgencies in Thailand-a Comparative Analysis," 
Sou theast Asian Spectrum (April 1975), p. 15. Also Thomas A. Marks, "Sino-Thai 
Relations," Asian Affairs, 61: 3 (October 1974), p. 309. 
42 Of the regional inslirgencies, the Meo are most directly dependent upon a 
high level of foreign (i.e., Chinese) support. Darling, "Rural Insurgencies," p. 15. 
43 Both are areas pinpointed in McColl's analysis of the most effective base area 
for guerilla operations in Thailand. Robert W. McColl, "A Political Geography of 
Revolution: China, Victnam and Thailand," journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 11 
(June 1967), pp. 153-167. For a detailed analysis of the Chinese-Vietnamese struggle 
for control of the Thai insurgency, see my "Tensions in the Thai Insurgency" 
(forthcoming). But for the Khao Klor mountains see FEER, June 26, 1976 and Daily 
This content downloaded from 130.102.158.19 on Tue, 22 Sep 2015 07:20:42 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
THE COMMUNIST PARTIES OF THAILAND AND LAOS 347 
The role of the Lao in this contest for influence was essential if 
Hanoi was to compete with Peking. There is no love lost between the 
Thai and the Vietnamese. To send Vietnamese cadres into Thailand 
could easily in the end be counterproductive.44 The Thai Internal Se- 
curity Operations Command (ISOC) claims to have evidence that 
"foreign military advisers" have caused some friction within CPT 
ranks.45 But if the Vietnamese are foreigners (and the presence of the 
unassimilated Vietnamese community in the northeast does not help 
their image), this hardly applies to the Lao, especially if they confine 
their activities to the Isan region where the Thai population is ethnic- 
ally and lingustically identical. LPRP cadres can move into the region 
at will and pass themselves off as Thai-Lao. In this more than in the 
provision of weapons and supplies, transit facilities, or training loca- 
tions, lies the importance of the Lao role in the Thai insurgency. The 
very ease with which the Lao can operate in Thailand, given their 
close identification with the Vietnamese, makes them doubly suspect in 
the eyes of the CPT central committee. 
The Vietnamese-backed invasion of Kampuchea in January 1979 
has radically changed the balance of forces in mainland southeast Asia, 
though the subsequent Chinese attack on Vietnam may to some extent 
mitigate its effect. The Vietnamese are likely to sign some kind of 
Friendship treaty with their puppet regime in Phnom Penh similar to 
that with Vientiane, thereby procuring, de facto, the federation they 
desired. They are then likely to turn to the problems of economic de- 
velopment and coping with the Chinese. Thus Pham van Dong's assur- 
ances in Bangkok that Hanoi would not support the Thai insurgents 
either directly or indirectly may perhaps be taken at face value. This 
will not mean that the Lao can escape involvement in "regional rival- 
ries." Since Peking will no longer be in a position to use Kampuchea 
to support the CPT, the Chinese will need to strengthen their control 
over northern Laos. This area is likely to become the principal arena 
for the ongoing Chinese-Vietnamese struggle, which in the short-term 
at least will replace Thai-Vietnamese competition. Alternatively Hanoi 
may decide it is in its interests to continue to compete, through the 
Lao, with Peking for influence over the Thai communist movement. 
Either alternative promises to exacerbate tensions between the LPRD 
and the CPT. 
Time (Bangkok), January 30, 1977 (FBIS, February 1, 1977); for the Kampuchean 
border see Richard Nations, "Fighting For a Frontier Formula," FEER, July 28, 1978. 
44There have been reports, however, of Vietnamese being taught Thai in 
schools in southern Laos, and of a combined battalion of Vietnamese, Lao, and 
Thai guerrillas operating in northeast Thailand, Interview with Lt. Col. Thanit 
Wasaphuti, Deputy Chief of 2nd Army Region Intelligence Radio Bangkok in Thai, 
August 23, 1977 (FBIS, August 25, 1977). AFP Bangkok reported Kampucheans were 
also accompanying CPT guerrillas (FBIS, February 28, 1978). 
45 Bangkok Post, February 7, 1976 (FBIS, February 9, 1976); later confirmed by 
Thai Deputy Defence Minister Lek Naeopmahi, Bangkok Post, September 8, 1977 
(FBIS, September 8, 1977). 
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Lao Irredentism and Northeastern Thailand 
There is one further factor that is affecting relations between the 
two parties which narrows the context of those relations still further, 
but which may shed additional light on the readiness of the Lao to 
risk a deterioration of relations with the CPT. (Given Thai depen- 
dency upon aid channelled through Laos, it is a risk the Lao perhaps 
feel they can take.) This factor hinges upon Lao ethnic and cultural 
ties with the northeastern region of Thailand which, since it once 
formed part of a greater Lao state, is the focus of Lao irredentism. 
Dreams of a greater Lao state have been nurtured to some extent by 
Lao of all political persuasions for some two hundred years, but there 
is reason to believe that the Lao left since the early 1950s has encour- 
aged the dissemination of such ideas more actively than did the now 
vanquished Lao right.46 It also appears that a radical Lao nationalist 
ferment is at work at least among lower level cadres of the LPRP. 
Whether or not a policy pursuing such claims would also coincide with 
Vietnamese long-term intentions is not at all clear; but the suspicion 
exists that the dismemberment of Thailand and creation of a Laos ex- 
tending over both banks of the Mekong (and still under de facto Viet- 
namese hegemony) would fulfil Vietnamese ambitions to dominate the 
Southeast Asian peninsula. 
It would not even be necessary for a communist government to 
take power in Bangkok. As Race notes: "What Viet Nam does need, 
and all it needs, is a relative weakening of Thailand by the truncation 
of its peripheral regions from the Central Plain."47 That this would 
not be in Chinese interests is obvious. A strong Thai state to confine 
Vietnamese ambitions would be far better. The frequent Thai accusa- 
tions that it is Vietnam's intention to annex part of the northeast, or 
set up a separate state here, deserve at least to be examined in the light 
of available evidence. If such is the Vietnamese-Lao intention, then it 
is certain to be strenuously opposed by the CPT as potential inheritors 
of the present Thai state, and must count as of considerable importance 
in affecting relations between the Thai and Lao communist parties. 
Separatist sentiment in the northeastern (Isan) region of Thailand 
has given the government in Bangkok further cause for alarm. Even 
before the outbreak of people's war in 1965, suppressed political op- 
position in the region had sought an outlet in separatism. Partly be- 
cause of the rightist orientation of military clique politics in Bangkok, 
but more as a result of the poverty and economic requirements of the 
region, Isan "oppositionism" has been predominantly socialist in con- 
tent. This combination of socialism and separatism has led the Thai 
government not only to charge that the communist parties of the Indo- 
46 The point is made by Pierre Fistie, "Minorites ethniques: opposition et sub- 
version en Thailande," Politique etrangere, 32: 3 (1967), p. 310. 
47 Race, "The Future of Thailand," p. 323. 
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china states are at the bottom of the problem, but also that they have 
the active support of the CPT in their designs.48 This is extremely un- 
likely, if only for the reason given above that it would not suit the 
Chinese and thus, given the links between Peking and the CPT, it 
would not suit the Thai communists either. In addition communists 
have seldom shown themselves less ardent nationalists in practice than 
the members of other political parties. And finally, while the CPT's 
fifth point in their ten-point short-term policy program of December 1, 
1968 promised the "right of autonomy" to the "various nationalities," 
presumably including the Thai-Lao of the northeast, this is to take 
place "within the big family of Thailand."49 Autonomy is not separ- 
atism, least of all in the context of communist parlance and practice. 
What then is the basis for accusations of Lao designs upon the 
northeast? The Lao maintain they have an historical right to the region 
that goes back to the kingdom of Lan Xang established in the 14th 
century. Only the break-up of this state in the early 18th century into 
the separate principalities of Luang Prabang, Vientiane, and Champ- 
asak permitted the powerful Thai state of Ayutthaya to seize control of 
the Lao west bank territories. The long years of Lao rule, however, had 
ensured that the region remained Lao in both language and culture. 
The Thai sack of Vientiane in 1829 that led to the deportation of 
thousands of Lao to the Isan provinces only reinforced the Lao ethnic 
character of northeastern Thailand. 
Modern Lao irredentist claims to the Isan region were stimulated 
by French attempts during the Second World War to encourage Lao 
nationalism as a foil against both the Japanese and their Thai allies. 
Researches into the Annals of Lan Xang revealed that the nominal 
hegemony exercised by the Kingdom of Lan Xang coincided with the 
geographical extension of the Lao race.50 This area forms the present 
basis for Lao dreams of a greater Lao state. Playing upon these dreams 
has been a corresponding fear on the part of the Lao of being absorbed 
by Thai and thus losing not only their national, but also their cultural 
identity, something many Lao feel is less likely to occur if their prin- 
cipal ties are with Vietnam. Conversely, it should be noted, Thai ir- 
redentism sees Bangkok as the center of a greater Thai state including 
not only Laos but also areas of southern China and the Shan parts of 
Burma. The initial stage in its formation would be to retrieve those 
48 It seems inconceivable that the CPT would agree to set up a government in 
eastern Laos or northeastern Thailand with a view to eventual dismemberment of 
the country into four separate states-Isan, Lanna (north), Siam (center), and Pattani 
(south)-said to have been advanced by the PL as part of their 1971 policy platform. 
Van der Kroef, "Thailand: A New Phase in Insurgency," p. 615. See also Dao Siam 
(Bangkok), January 23, 1977 (FBIS, January 25, 1977). 
49 VOPT, January 6, 1969, quoted in Weatherbee, The United Front in Thai- 
land, p. 68. 
50 Katay Don Sasorith, "Historical Aspects of Laos," in Rene de Berval (ed.), 
Kingdom of Laos (Saigon: France-Asie, 1959), p. 29. Katay was cofounder with 
Nhouy Abhay of the National Renovation Movement, which was largely responsible 
for the rebirth of Lao Nationalism in the 1940s. 
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areas under Thai hegemony before the arrival of the French, notably 
most of the present day Laos. 
The Bangkok government has consistently charged that Lao ir- 
redentist ambitions have taken the form of encouraging Isan separ- 
atism. There is some evidence for this, but it is by no means the whole 
story. The curious thing about these charges of Isan separatism is the 
way they followed military coups and renewed repression. It is far 
more likely that autonomist (rather than separatist-the distinction is 
one that has usually managed to escape Bangkok) sentiments flowered 
as a result of the repressive measures instituted by each Central Thai 
military clique to seize power and the ending of any possibility of ex- 
pressing Isan aspirations in the form of legitimate opposition in the 
political arena. 
With the announced formation of the TPF on January 1, 1965, 
the bogey of Isan separatism became merged with overall communist 
strategy for Thailand in the eyes of the Thai government, thus con- 
firming, like a self-fulfilling prophecy, the link Bangkok had always 
believed existed. All insurgents in the northeast were henceforth com- 
munists, partners in an insidious plot to destroy the Thai state. The 
insurgents were treated as foreign agents rather than as disgruntled 
Thai. With the communist victories of 1975 the fear was no longer of 
separatism but of annexation through invasion. As unlikely as this 
seems, such a scheme might well appeal to certain Lao even if effected 
with Vietnamese arms. 
The victory of the Pathet Lao does appear to have given new life 
to Lao irredentism on the northeast. The 1973 cease-fire between Pathet 
Lao and rightist forces in Laos provided a brief opportunity for move- 
ment between the two zones of control, and some western journalists 
took the opportunity to visit PL controlled villages just across the cease- 
fire line. At political meetings support was whipped up for the PL by 
communist cadres reciting the historical crimes of the Thai and calling 
for a continuation of the Lao national struggle until "all" Lao were 
united.51 Since the PL took over the government in 1975 this theme 
has reportedly been sounded in private conversation with communist 
cadres. The standard line is that any decision to "federate" with Laos 
would have to come from the people of the northeast themselves.52 
51 John Everingham, personal communication, January 1977. Everingham re- 
ported visiting the village of Pak Hao a few kilometers south of Luang Prabang 
where he attended such a gathering. A frequent theme in conversations with lower 
level LPRP cadres was the eventual liberation of all Lao and their incorporation in 
a greater Lao state. See also Phra Mahacanla Tanbuali, Sathzaana Phra-PhuttJha- 
Saasanaa nai Pratheet Saathaaranarat Drachaathipotai Prachaachou Laau ("The 
State of the Buddhist Religion in the People's Democratic Republic of Laos"), 
(Bangkok: Khana Saasanikachon, 1977), pp. 90-91, where this Buddhist monk 
claims to have attended a number of meetings on the subject. 
52 Everingham quoted one Lao cadre as saying it had taken the PL thirty years 
to win half the Lao territories (i.e., Laos), and they were prepared to fight another 
thirty years to gain the rest (i.e., northeastern Thailand). This reflected the will of 
the Isan people. 
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There are some very good reasons why the PL may have deliber- 
ately chosen to exploit popular and widespread Lao irredentist senti- 
ments in 1973. Their support lay largely with the tribal minorities in 
the mountainous east of the country. It was necessary to win over the 
lowland Lao.53 Anti-Thai propaganda served the double purpose of 
distracting attention from Lao government accusations that the PL 
were merely creatures of the Vietnamese, and confirmed the PL's own 
claim to be good Lao nationalists fighting for independence and neu- 
trality against American imperialism. But while the northeast of Thai- 
land offers a tempting target for Lao expansionism and provides an 
external goal to inspire the lower echelons of the LPRP, it seems un- 
likely that at higher levels of policy planning such dreams are allowed 
to interfere with more realistic assessments of the success of such a 
venture in the present multipolar world of nation states. 
Despite this, however, the CPT is apparently wary of the effect 
Lao nationalism may have on the Isan region. Cadres are quick to 
correct any dangerous tendencies towards pan-Laoism instilled into 
Isan trainees by their PL instructors. And if there is no evidence that 
on a higher party to party level there is any tension over the status of 
the northeast, yet it is indicative of the interest the question generates 
that senior Pathet Lao officials have felt it necessary categorically to 
deny that Laos has any claims on Thai territory.54 For while Lao irre- 
dentism with regard to the northeast of Thailand on the grounds of 
history, race, and language may be fulfilling a useful internal role in 
Laos by generating a much-needed sense of national unity and purpose, 
the LPRP may yet come to lay too great a store by its own propaganda. 
Given altered circumstances and combined with the kind of ideological 
and geopolitical factors discussed above, Lao irredentism could further 
exacerbate relations between the LPRP and the CPT. 
Conclusion 
In summary, this paper, in analyzing the factors affecting relations 
between the communist parties of Laos and Thailand, has indicated 
that certain tensions do already exist. While these are largely clue to an 
increasing ideological polarization between the two parties along the 
lines of the Sino-Soviet cleavage, two additional factors-Thai-Vietna- 
mese rivalry complicated by Chinese-Vietnamese antipathy, and Lao 
irredentism-cannot be left out of account. Competition for influence 
over the Thai revolution as a result of both Sino-Soviet and Chinese- 
Vietnamese rivalry is generating tension between those involved. The 
firmly pro-Chinese position of the CPT Central Committee has not 
53 For an account of problems this posed for the PL, see Martin Stuart-Fox, 
"The Lao Revolution: Errors and Achievements," World Review, 16: 2 (July 1977), 
pp. 3-15. 
54 Interview with Souphanouvong, January 16, 1976, carried in Journal of Con- 
temporary Asia, 6: 1 (1976), p. 109. 
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prevented the Vietnamese from attempting to undermine Peking's hold 
on the party. The involvement of the Lao in carrying out this Vietna- 
mese strategy has raised the suspicions of the CPT, especially in view 
of the effect Lao irredentism could have on northeastern Thailand. 
To what extent these suspicions and tensions will affect the prog- 
ress and direction of the Thai insurgency is impossible to tell. All that 
can be said is that the three factors analyzed in this paper will remain 
of key importance in determining the state of relations not only be- 
tween the Thai and Lao communist parties, but also, in the event of 
a communist revolution in Thailand, between the respective govern- 
ments of the two states. 
MARTIN STUART-FOX is Tutor in the history of Asian civilizations, Department 
of History, University of Queensland, Australia; he served for two years as a UPI 
correspondent in Laos. 
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